AP Comparative Government: Russia Unit V: Chapter 7





Wednesday	12/6	**Video: Putin's Way Part I**
Thursday	12/7	**Notes: Influence of Communism**
Friday	12/8	Video: **Putin's Way Part II. Class Discussion**
Monday	12/11	Notes: Russia: Its geography, culture and current government
Tuesday	12/12	Finish Notes on Russia.
" Wednesday	12/13	**Video:** Putin's Revenge
Thursday	12/14	**Video:** Putin's Revenge
Friday	12/15	**Video:** Putin's Revenge
Wednesday 12/20 period.		**Present semester book reviews and collect during exam Eighth period 7:30-9:17**
Wednesday	1/3	**Russia's Constitution** (Group Activity)
Thursday	1/4	**Comparing Russia to Britain** (Group Activity)
Friday	1/5	**Video:** Commanding Heights (questions attached)

Monday 1/08	Answers due: **"Rule of Law: Russian Style" Class Discussion**
Tuesday 1/09	Finish **Commanding Heights**, Hand in questions.
Wednesday 1/10 **Class Discussion.**	**Critical Review Due "Making of the Neo KGB State"**
Thursday 1/11 **T/F**	**Open Book Reading Quiz Ch. 7 Sec 1 &2 pp. 263-282.**
Friday 1/12 **Simulation)**	**Debating Putin's Reforms/Research and picking asides. (Duma**
Monday 1/15	**No School: Martin Luther King JR Day!**
Tuesday 1/16	**Open Book Quiz pp. 282-298 (To Elections). T/F**
Wednesday 1/17	**Debating Putin's Reforms in class/ Debrief after debate.**
Thursday 1/18	**" Putin's Reforms "**
Friday 1/19	**Quiz 298-311 Open Note .**
Monday 1/22	**Review for Test/Discuss Essay Questions**
Tuesday 1/23 minutes	**Russia Test: Multiple choice and T/F 50 Questions 45 Note cards due.**
Wednesday 1/24	**Russia Free Response Test: two questions 45 Minutes**



AP Comp. Gov

- FT forms / EOL announcement/Jeopardy reminder/bring computers next time
- Russia Notes & video clips
- Activity (either A or B):

A. Write a graduation speech by President Putin, using 3 things you learned.
B. Write a letter to the school newspaper criticizing president Putin, using three things you learned.
Read your speech/letter.

Current Russia - Video Clips

(1) Get out the vote video

(2) Promotional Video (Putin for Prime Minister)

(3) 60 Minutes - Female Rioters (11 minutes)

(4) NASHI (14 minutes)

(5) Putin's Media War (23 minutes)

Russia Notes Part 1:

Overview of the Russian Federation & Challenges to Democratic Transition



Russian Federation

- Federal system of government; Bicameral (Federation Council & Duma)
- Mixed Presidential Parliamentary System
- Natural Resources: Natural Gas/Oil
- Ethnicity 80% Russian 20% minority
- 99% Literacy Rate

Russian History Overview = History of Strong Leaders

- **Czarist Russia**
- **Russian Revolution (1917)**
- **Soviet Union** (Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Gorbachev)
- **Russian Federation (1991)** (Putin)

Creation of the Russian Federation

Referenda #1 Yeltsin (yes or no) (1991)
Voter Turnout: Reported 68% of eligible voters. Yes votes: 71 No votes: 28%

Referenda #2 Constitution (yes or no) (1993)
Voter turnout: Reported 54% of eligible voters
Margin of victory: 58%

Challenges of Russian Federation's Democratic Transition

Lack of civil society, legitimacy, and rule of law makes Russian democratic transition shaky.
civil society = existence of voluntary associations.
political legitimacy = citizen's belief in government's right to rule.
Rule of law = rules/laws being enforced & applied equally to all citizens, regardless of stature.

Russia Notes Part 2:

Mixed Presidential-Parliamentary System of Government

Mixed Presidential Parliamentary System of Government

Dual executive (President =Head of State; PM=Head of Govt).
President Two ballot system. Presidential elections are regularly scheduled.
Prime Minister selected by President from dominant party in the Duma and the President can dissolve the Duma & call for elections. If Prime Minister loses confidence Duma elections can be called (irregular elections).
Cabinet is selected from Parliament ; Cabinet ministers must resign from parliament to separate powers.



Russia Notes Part 3:

Russia's Legislature and The Political Party System

Russia's Legislature

Bicameral

Upper House = Federation Council

Lower House = Duma

- ***First elections produced a communist dominated legislature.***
- ***Early party system very fragmented and called "divan" party system, meaning Russian word for "couch" indicating # of members fit on one couch.***

Russia's Legislature & Multi-party System

Too many parties to get policies accomplished. Most parties initially formed solely around the approach to economic reform, advocating shock therapy, a slow approach to market reform, or no economic reform. Eventually parties became more durable.

Major Political Parties

1. **Unity -**
2. Communist -
3. Yabloko -
4. National Front-

Russia Notes Part 4:
Vladimir Putin's Policies

What will be the impact of President Putin on Russia?

Russia: Current Politics

What do you know about President Putin's policies?



**Multi-party Party System -
& Changes by Putin**

- Under Putin all Proportional Representation (PR) Duma elections were established with 7% minimum threshold (originally had ½ PR and ½ SMD).
- Unity Party (backed by Putin) created in 2000
- Fair Russia (2006)
- http://www.russiavotes.org/duma/duma_elections_93-03.php

Federalism & Putin

- Federation Council (upper house) appointed (originally they were directly elected).
- Governors are directly elected but can be fired by President, and candidates must come from a list approved by the President.
- Referenda on Chechen independence was held under Putin (2003 failed)

Independent Media & Freedom of Speech under Putin

- Purchase of state owned media (NTV, ORT and TV-6)
- Small media outlets (blogs etc) have been proliferating, including popular Russian blogger Alexi Navalny.
- Murders of critical independent journalists followed by lack of investigation/prosecution.
- Increased regulations/red tape on citizens wishing to demonstrate.
- Suspension of many NGOs that lack Russian "Nationalism"?

Prime Minister Putin

Changes to Length of Presidential Term

- From a limit of two four-year terms to a term of six years and the ability of a leader to return).
- Putin proposed change to Constitution which was ratified.

Rule of Law

- Constitutional Court judges are appointed by President & approved by federation council. Judiciary is officially independent, but critics allege political

Khodorkovsky wealthy oil co owner, ja

- "Telephone Justice" (or show trials) are believed to still be in place. During Soviet times, central government would call a judge and order the outcome of a case.
- Like China, Russia had no history of independent courts nor lawyers/judges trained in a democratic legal process. Some evidence that jury trials are of private citizens are becoming more fair- "The 9"

Gender Politics

- Number of women in the Duma increasing & women dominate NGOs.
- The number of female entrepreneurs is increasing.
- Public policies favorable to women include generous maternity leave, subsidies for having children (maternity capital) and "accessible surroundings"



Women in Parliament

Russia

From: *Inter parliamentary Union*

Responsible Male Campaign

- Day of Family, Love and Fidelity (2008)

Russia - annexation of Crimea (More to come)

Vladimir Putin

Public Approval = 80% throughout his leadership



Economic Growth



What conclusions can you draw?

The Influence of Communism

Which countries in the world were communist?
Which countries are currently communist?

Introductory Terms

- authoritarian system –
  a system of government in which power is concentrated in the hands of one political party or small group of leaders.
- Communism –
  a system of government in which only one party, the communist party, governs. The party's stated ideological goals are "Marxism" (economic egalitarianism) and strives to achieve this through a command economy. The only way to advance in society is through the party (nomenklatura), and party membership is strictly limited to the elite (top 5%).

Introductory Terms (part 2)

- Karl Marx-
  a German philosopher who predicted that, after industrialization, countries would go through a wrenching change (the ***dialectic****). Workers would not accept low wages and would demand a share of profits, overthrowing wealthy business owners and creating a classless society* ***(historical materialism).***
- Democratic Centralism-
  Governing principle of communist systems of government. Literally means "democracy at the center" allowing debate among party elites. After policy decisions are made, no dissent is tolerated.

Economic System - Comparison

- Command economy –
- an economic system in which the central government plans the amount of goods to be produced (usually in a five year plan) and sets wages for workers and prices for goods. The state employs workers and controls all means of producing goods (private entrepreneurs are not allowed).
- Market economy –
- an economic system in which prices of goods and means a production are decided by the principles of supply and demand. Businesses are motivated by profit incentives and businesses are free to compete within a market.

COMMUNIST SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT

Party Control –

Political party controls all aspects of political, economic and social life. This includes all leadership positions, school curriculum, all retail sales, books, press, movement, professions, child rearing and all goods are communal. The communist party provides an "iron rice bow" (meaning government benefits) and a sense of stability.

Cult of Personality –

In most communist systems, citizens develop an extraordinary idolization of their leader which is exhibited through large statues/monuments/photos of the leader.

Top down political participation –

Top down political participation is defined as participation which is orchestrated from the top. Political leaders require citizens to demonstrate in favor of leadership or may require citizens to vote.

Nomenklatura





Complete -
Comparing Democratic & Authoritarian Systems (Handout)

Let's Compare
What are the similarities? What are the differences.

Democracy	Authoritarian
Functions of Political Parties •Act as linkage institutions •Pick Candidates •Run campaigns •Give cues to voters •Articulate policies •Coordinate policymaking •Staff government •Mobilize the public •Act as loyal opposition	Functions of Political Parties

Let's Compare

Democracy	Authoritarian
Forms of Political Participation •Voting •Protesting •Joining a party •Joining an interest group •Contacting a congressperson •Writing a letter to the editor •Running for office •Assisting in a campaign •Strikes/boycotts	Forms of Political Participation

Let's Compare

Democracy	**Authoritarian**
Market Economy •Principles of supply and demand set prices for goods •Profit motive provides incentive for production •Is likely to result in unequal distribution of wealth •Government regulates some aspects of the economy	Command Economy

Rule of Law, Russian-Style

KATHRYN HENDLEY

Almost without exception, Russia languishes near the bottom of indexes that purport to measure elements of the "rule of law" in countries around the world. Assessing the extent to which this contempt is deserved depends on how rule of law is defined. As the term has become part of the global political lexicon, its precise meaning has become increasingly opaque. Even so, the principle that law should apply in equal measure to everyone, irrespective of wealth or political clout, is generally accepted as the foundational principle of the rule of law. By this standard, Russia falls short today. What is worse, the continuing behavior of Russia's public officials, as well as deeply set attitudes among ordinary Russians, offers little promise of improvement any time soon.

Certainly Russia's history provides little evidence of commitment to a universalistic view of law. Both the czars and the Communist Party leadership routinely used law as a blunt instrument to advance their interests, enforcing it strictly against the powerless, but stretching it beyond recognition to accommodate themselves and their favorites. Laws were often written in the broadest terms possible so as to give officials maximum flexibility.

Beginning with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's endorsement of a "rule-of-law-based state" (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) at the outset of perestroika, the Kremlin's rhetoric shifted. The leaders who have followed Gorbachev have likewise committed themselves to the goal of universalistic law. Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev, who like Gorbachev are legally trained, have both spoken repeatedly of the importance of institutionalizing a "supremacy of law" (*gospodstvo zakona*). Sadly, their policies have often failed to match their rhetoric.

Much like their predecessors, these post-Soviet leaders have proved willing to countenance the manipulation of law when it has been inconvenient to live up to the law. The Kremlin's seemingly endless campaign against oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky and his company, Yukos, is only the most notorious example. Not only does such behavior demonstrate the shallowness of Russia's commitment to the civil liberties embodied in the country's constitution and criminal procedure code, but it also reveals the Kremlin's lack of respect for the independence of the judicial branch.

The Kremlin's brazen disregard of legal niceties whenever the law threatens to cramp its style contributes to an "anything goes" legal culture in Russia. Human rights activists and journalists have been murdered with seeming impunity. Business is riddled with corruption. To some extent, of course, this is nothing new. Finding creative ways to get around (*oboiti*) the law has long been the norm in Russia. Indeed, it was a critical coping mechanism in response to the perennial shortages of the Soviet era.

In a perfect world, skirting the law would have become unnecessary with the end of state socialism and, more importantly, unacceptable. But the chaotic nature of the transition only emboldened those who sought to circumvent legal constraints. The well-known adage in Russia, "It is forbidden, but if you really want to do it, then go ahead" (*eto nel'zya, no esli ochen' khochetsya, to mozhno*), captures this sentiment perfectly. So long as those who engage in extralegal behavior stay out of the way of those more powerful, the state has turned a blind eye.

Dual Justice

Most outside observers have assumed that all of these shortcomings add up to a legal system that is dysfunctional and virtually unusable. As usual, Russia confounds expectations. Over the past two decades, with surprisingly little fanfare, the legislative base and institutional infrastructure of the Russian legal system have undergone a remarkable transformation. Citizens' access to the legal system has been enhanced through the introduction of justice-of-the-peace courts (*mirovye sudy*), which have absorbed the bulk of simple cases, freeing up other courts to devote attention to more complicated cases. Thanks to the internet, information about the substance of law and the activities of courts at all levels is increasingly transparent.

Not coincidentally, Russians' use of the courts has grown dramatically. The number of civil (non-criminal) cases has doubled over the past decade. But people's use of the courts is savvy. Russians seek help from the courts when they encounter disputes with those who are similarly situated; they shy away from the courts when they tangle with anyone more powerful.

The dual legal system that has evolved in Russia—in which the courts can be relied on to handle mundane cases, but are likely to bow to the will of the powerful in touchier cases—is a far cry from the rule-of-law-based state that was the initial goal. At the same time, it does provide a small measure of the sort of predictability that lies at the heart of the rule of law. In Russia's

legal system an uneasy equilibrium is at play, one that has eluded the media and even many legal analysts. Russians have an innate sense of when to use the courts and when to avoid them.

How the Fish Rots

Even so, a more robust rule of law in Russia will require fundamental changes in attitudes and behavior on the part of both state and society. In my own research, when I have asked ordinary Russians how to fix their legal system, they often remind me of the proverb that "the fish rots from the head" (*ryba gniyot golovy*). To date, the political leadership has talked the talk, but has not walked the walk. The citizenry has grown weary of endless promises. The prescription for the Kremlin can be stated simply—the state and its bureaucrats need to obey the laws they impose on others. Ending the "anything goes" legal culture will not be easy. Solving problems by cutting corners and making side payments is deeply entrenched.

To outsiders, the anticorruption campaign announced by Medvedev when he became president may seem like a good first step toward reining in the state. But Russians have heard it all before. Those with long memories will recall that Putin likewise came to office with a pledge to break the stranglehold of corruption. To be fair, Medvedev has done more than pay lip service. He has acted to limit the discretion of local officials to demand repeated inspections of businesses (thereby giving them multiple opportunities to demand payoffs). He has ordered more oversight of the state procurement process. And he has pushed for fuller disclosure of state officials' incomes and assets.

However, the depth of the Kremlin's commitment to rooting out corruption remains to be seen. Public opinion polling suggests that Russians are unconvinced of that commitment. In a February 2009 survey conducted by the Levada Center, most (53 percent) felt that Medvedev's initiative had made no difference. Indeed, 21 percent believed corruption had worsened since his election.

Enhancing the rule of law in Russia is not entirely a matter of state action. Medvedev has famously railed against the "legal nihilism" of Russian society, but he has been slow to recognize that society is taking its cues from its leaders in its disregard of the law. For anything to change, Russians have to shake off their traditional passivity vis-à-vis the state. Human rights groups have taken an important step in this regard through their use of the European Court of Human Rights. The Strasbourg court has been swamped by Russian claims, most of which allege a failure on the part of the state to live up to its obligations under the law.

For anything to change, Russians have to shake off their traditional passivity vis-à-vis the state.

But this is an elite strategy; ordinary Russians know little of the European court. In my research, I have been struck by the unwillingness of the ordinary Russians with whom I have spoken to take on any responsibility for the condition of the legal system. It does not seem to occur to them that they could demand more from their political leaders. The weakness of civil society in Russia does not augur well for the development of a more robust rule of law.

Critical Thinking

1. What is "rule of law"? How is "rule of law" achieved?
2. What are the consequences of not achieving "rule of law"?
3. What does "the fish rots from the head" refer to? Should society wait for the state to change? Why or why not?
4. What are "justice-of-the-peace" courts? How do they help or hurt institutional-building?
5. How does the European Court of Human Rights help or hurt the situation in Russia? How does this relate to the previous article?

KATHRYN HENDLEY is a professor of law and political science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

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Russia Unit

Unit Overview

Russia is an important case study for students of AP Comparative Government & Politics. Russia was once a part of the powerful Soviet Union and used a Communist system of government. Today Russia provides a key example of the struggle faced by former communist countries that attempt to effectively transition to a democratic form of government. The Soviet Union and communism has shaped much of Russia's past and has impacted the present system of government and its people greatly. Because of this, students studying Russia will examine the system of government of Russia as part of the Soviet Union and the system of government of Russia today, as a country attempting to transition to democracy.

Objectives

In this unit, students will learn about the following:

- Key vocabulary related to the Soviet Union and Russia
- How current political and economic data related to current Russia can be interpreted
- Marxist political theory and its impact
- Constitutional powers of the major institutions of government in Russia
- The process and impact of privatization in Russia
- Public policy changes made in Russia under President Vladimir Putin and their impact for democracy
- Similarities and differences between Russia and the United Kingdom

Vocabulary Review Activity (45 minutes)

Directions: This activity will ask students to review vocabulary that is commonly used in Comparative Government & Politics courses when studying Russia. This list should both review as well as supplement most core textbooks. Some of these terms, such as "illiberal democracy" may require teachers to look at the AP Central Web Site for reference. This lesson will be most useful if it is used towards the end of your unit.

To complete this activity, you will be dividing your class into 4-5 groups. Make 4-5 copies of the list on page 10 (to correspond with your groups) and cut out the words and cut out the definitions. Paste each word on an index card and each definition on an index card. Keep one complete copy for you to use as a key. At the beginning of class, tell students their group will be competing against another group to match the correct definition with the appropriate word. Give each group a set of words and a set of definitions (make sure these are scrambled) and ask the students to place the correct word on top of a definition. When a group is finished, come around and check to be sure the pairings are correct. If time permits, have students come up with a concrete example of the term as it pertains to Russia.

Interpreting Data Activity (45 minutes)

Directions: In this activity, students will review some key political and economic data about Russia. This activity should be completed towards the end of the unit, when students have become familiar with political and economic change that has occurred. Students should know the definition and significance of economic terms such as "GDP" (gross domestic product, measures level of economic production within a country. Countries with high GDP generally have higher standards of living), inflation, privatization/shock therapy, market economy.

Pass out the data and the questions. Allow students to work in pairs and use their textbooks to find support for their answers where appropriate. Go over the answers with the class when they are finished. At the conclusion of the activity, ask students what conclusions they can draw from the data they have examined.

Activity 1: Communism + Soviet Union (45 Minutes)

1. Review the definitions of the following terms with students (see vocabulary review for definitions). Ask students to compare/contrast each term to check for understanding of similarities and differences.
   a. Marxism
   b. Marxism-Leninism
   c. Communism
   d. nomenklatura
   e. Socialism
   f. totalitarianism

2. Ask students to read excerpts from the "Communist Manifesto" by Karl Marx.
3. As they read they should define terms and answer questions (handouts to complete the activity on page 16).

Activity 2: Powers of the Institutions of Government (45 minutes)

Directions: Print and copy the Russian Constitution (available at **http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/constit.html**) or have students access the Constitution on line. Have students read the Constitution and complete the chart (handout for activity 2 on page 18). Go over students findings and ask the following discussion questions:

- Why do you think the Russians decided to create such a strong Presidency? What are the benefits for Russia in having a strong Presidency? What is the downside?
- Is the Prime Minister as powerful as the Constitution states? Why or why not?
- Is this Constitution stronger or weaker than the unwritten Constitution in the United Kingdom? Provide examples to support your answer.

Activity 2: The Russian Constitution

http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/constit.html

As you read the Constitution, paraphrase the powers listed below.

Fundamentals of the Constitutional System, Chapter 1	What type of system does the Constitution set up? What similarities do you see between this system and the United States? Referendum – Local government -
Rights and Liberties of Man and Citizen **Chapter 2**	What rights does the Constitution give to Russian citizens? (list 3-5)
The Russian Federation **Chapter 3**	Summarize the objectives of this part of the Constitution
The President of the Russian Federation **Chapter 4**	Outline the powers of the Russian President.
The Federal Assembly Chapter 5	What is the Federal Assembly? What are the two houses of the Federal Assembly?

	How many members are in the Duma? How long is their term of office? How are members of the Federation Council selected? What are the powers of the Duma? What are the powers of the Federation Council? What Presidential power is mentioned?
The Government of the Russian Federation **Chapter 6**	How does the "Chairman of the Russian Federation" (Prime Minister) get appointed? Who is head of state? Who is head of government? What are the responsibilities of the government of the Russian federation?

	What is the relationship between the President and the Chairman (discussed in Article 117?)
The Judiciary Chapter 7	How long do judges serve? How are judges appointed? What is their role/responsibility? What is the role of the Supreme Court?
Local Self Government Chapter 8	What are the responsibilities of local government?
Constitutional Amendments and Revisions Chapter 9	How can the Constitution be amended?
Concluding and transitional provisions	By what method was the Constitution accepted?

Activity 3 Handout

Commanding Heights: Battle for the World Economy: Russia PBS

1. Why did Gorbachev go to Beijing in 1989?
2. What types of economic reforms had China made?
3. What are the differences in the economies of Russia and China?
4. What approach to the economy did Gorbachev want to take?
5. What impact did the 1991 coup have on Gorbachev?
6. Gaidar-
7. What was the impact of Gorbachev's reforms on the economy?
8. Chubaias-
9. The parliament was dominated by whom?
10. What was the goal of the reformers?
11. What law did Gaidar abolish?
12. Reform meant what for the economy?
13. What was Chubais in charge of?
14. Each citizen got a voucher worth what?
15. Young reformers had to move fast to prevent what?
16. How was the Bolshevik biscuit factory privatized?
17. What happened the next day in Parliament?
18. Chernomyrdin-
19. Who were the "red directors"?
20. The government and the oligarchs feared what?
21. Describe the "loan for shares" deal.

Unit Activity – How does Russia compare to the United Kingdom?

	Russia	United Kingdom
Constitution		
Head of State and Head of Government		
Political Party System		
Executive Legislative Relations		
Referenda		
Federal/Unitary structure		
Civil Liberties and Rights		
Civil Society		

Legitimacy		
Political and Economic Change		

Name _______________

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/lo/index.html

Commanding Heights: Battle for the World Economy: Russia PBS

Directions click link above, click "countries," click "Russia," click "video." Then watch the segments below.

"Gorbachev Tries China 1991" through "Loans for Shares"

1. Why did Gorbachev go to Beijing in 1989?
2. What types of economic reforms had China made?
3. What are the differences in the economies of Russia and China?
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19. Who were the “red directors”?

20. The government and the oligarchs feared what?

21. Describe the “loan for shares” deal.

22. Potanin

Discussion Questions

(1) This video traces the history of privatization in Russia. What is your reaction to this process?

(2) Define shock therapy.

(3) In your opinion, was shock therapy a good policy for Russia? Defend your answer.

The Making of a Neo-KGB State

Political power in Russia now lies with the FSB, the KGB's successor.

On the evening of August 22nd 1991—16 years ago this week—Alexei Kondaurov, a KGB general, stood by the darkened window of his Moscow office and watched a jubilant crowd moving towards the KGB headquarters in Lubyanka Square. A coup against Mikhail Gorbachev had just been defeated. The head of the KGB who had helped to orchestrate it had been arrested, and Mr Kondaurov was now one of the most senior officers left in the fast-emptying building. For a moment the thronged masses seemed to be heading straight towards him.

Then their anger was diverted to the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky, the KGB's founding father. A couple of men climbed up and slipped a rope round his neck. Then he was yanked up by a crane. Watching "Iron Felix" sway in mid-air, Mr Kondaurov, who had served in the KGB since 1972, felt betrayed "by Gorbachev, by Yeltsin, by the impotent coup leaders". He remembers thinking, "I will prove to you that your victory will be short-lived."

Those feelings of betrayal and humiliation were shared by 500,000 KGB operatives across Russia and beyond, including Vladimir Putin, whose resignation as a lieutenant-colonel in the service had been accepted only the day before. Eight years later, though, the KGB men seemed poised for revenge. Just before he became president, Mr Putin told his ex-colleagues at the Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB's successor, "A group of FSB operatives, dispatched under cover to work in the government of the Russian federation, is successfully fulfilling its task." He was only half joking.

Over the two terms of Mr Putin's presidency, that "group of FSB operatives" has consolidated its political power and built a new sort of corporate state in the process. Men from the FSB and its sister organisations control the Kremlin, the government, the media and large parts of the economy—as well as the military and security forces. According to research by Olga Kryshtanovskaya, a sociologist at the Russian Academy of Sciences, a quarter of the country's senior bureaucrats are *siloviki*—a Russian word meaning, roughly, "power guys", which includes members of the armed forces and other security services, not just the FSB. The proportion rises to three-quarters if people simply affiliated to the security services are included. These people represent a psychologically homogeneous group, loyal to roots that go back to the Bolsheviks' first political police, the Cheka. As Mr Putin says repeatedly, "There is no such thing as a former Chekist."

By many indicators, today's security bosses enjoy a combination of power and money without precedent in Russia's history. The Soviet KGB and its pre-revolutionary ancestors did not care much about money; power was what mattered. Influential though it was, the KGB was a "combat division" of the Communist Party, and subordinate to it. As an outfit that was part intelligence organisation, part security agency and part secret political police, it was often better informed, but it could not act on its own authority; it could only make "recommendations". In the 1970s and 1980s it was not even allowed to spy on the party bosses and had to act within Soviet laws, however inhuman.

The KGB provided a crucial service of surveillance and suppression; it was a state within a state. Now, however, it has become the state itself. Apart from Mr Putin, "There is nobody today who can say no to the FSB," says Mr Kondaurov.

All important decisions in Russia, says Ms Kryshtanovskaya, are now taken by a tiny group of men who served alongside Mr Putin in the KGB and who come from his home town of St Petersburg. In the next few months this coterie may well decide the outcome of next year's presidential election. But whoever succeeds Mr Putin, real power is likely to remain in the organisation. Of all the Soviet institutions, the KGB withstood Russia's transformation to capitalism best and emerged strongest. "Communist ideology has gone, but the methods and psychology of its secret police have remained," says Mr Kondaurov, who is now a member of parliament.

Scotched, Not Killed

Mr Putin's ascent to the presidency of Russia was the result of a chain of events that started at least a quarter of a century earlier, when Yuri Andropov, a former head of the KGB, succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as general secretary of the Communist Party. Andropov's attempts to reform the stagnating Soviet economy in order to preserve the Soviet Union and its political system have served as a model for Mr Putin. Early in his presidency Mr Putin unveiled a plaque at the Lubyanka headquarters that paid tribute to Andropov as an "outstanding political figure".

Staffed by highly educated, pragmatic men recruited in the 1960s and 1970s, the KGB was well aware of the dire state of the Soviet economy and the antique state of the party bosses. It was therefore one of the main forces behind *perestroika,* the loose policy of restructuring started by Mr Gorbachev in the

1980s. *Perestroika*'s reforms were meant to give the Soviet Union a new lease of life. When they threatened its existence, the KGB mounted a coup against Mr Gorbachev. Ironically, this precipitated the Soviet collapse.

The defeat of the coup gave Russia an historic chance to liquidate the organisation. "If either Gorbachev or Yeltsin had been bold enough to dismantle the KGB during the autumn of 1991, he would have met little resistance," wrote Yevgenia Albats, a journalist who has courageously covered the grimmest chapters in the KGB's history. Instead, both Mr Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried to reform it.

The "blue blood" of the KGB—the First Chief Directorate, in charge of espionage—was spun off into a separate intelligence service. The rest of the agency was broken into several parts. Then, after a few short months of talk about openness, the doors of the agency slammed shut again and the man charged with trying to reform it, Vadim Bakatin, was ejected. His glum conclusion, delivered at a conference in 1993, was that although the myth about the KGB's invincibility had collapsed, the agency itself was very much alive.

Indeed it was. The newly named Ministry of Security continued to "delegate" the officers of the "active reserve" into state institutions and commercial firms. Soon KGB officers were staffing the tax police and customs services. As Boris Yeltsin himself admitted by the end of 1993, all attempts to reorganise the KGB were "superficial and cosmetic"; in fact, it could not be reformed. "The system of political police has been preserved," he said, "and could be resurrected."

Yet Mr Yeltsin, though he let the agency survive, did not use it as his power base. In fact, the KGB was cut off from the post-Soviet redistribution of assets. Worse still, it was upstaged and outwitted by a tiny group of opportunists, many of them Jews (not a people beloved by the KGB), who became known as the oligarchs. Between them, they grabbed most of the country's natural resources and other privatised assets. KGB officers watched the oligarchs get super-rich while they stayed cash-strapped and sometimes even unpaid.

Some officers did well enough, but only by offering their services to the oligarchs. To protect themselves from rampant crime and racketeering, the oligarchs tried to privatise parts of the KGB. Their large and costly security departments were staffed and run by ex-KGB officers. They also hired senior agency men as "consultants". Fillip Bobkov, the head of the Fifth Directorate (which dealt with dissidents), worked for a media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky. Mr Kondaurov, a former spokesman for the KGB, worked for Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who ran and largely owned Yukos. "People who stayed in the FSB were B-list," says Mark Galeotti, a British analyst of the Russian special services.

Lower-ranking staff worked as bodyguards to Russia's rich. (Andrei Lugovoi, the chief suspect in the murder in London last year of Alexander Litvinenko, once guarded Boris Berezovsky, an oligarch who, facing arrest in Russia, now lives in Britain.) Hundreds of private security firms staffed by KGB veterans sprang up around the country and most of them, though not all, kept their ties to their *alma mater.* According to Igor Goloshchapov, a former KGB special-forces commando who is now a spokesman for almost 800,000 private security men,

In the 1990s we had one objective: to survive and preserve our skills. We did not consider ourselves to be separate from those who stayed in the FSB. We shared everything with them and we saw our work as just another form of serving the interests of the state. We knew that there would come a moment when we would be called upon.

That moment came on New Year's Eve 1999, when Mr Yeltsin resigned and, despite his views about the KGB, handed over the reins of power to Mr Putin, the man he had put in charge of the FSB in 1998 and made prime minister a year later.

The Inner Circle

As the new president saw things, his first task was to restore the management of the country, consolidate political power and neutralise alternative sources of influence: oligarchs, regional governors, the media, parliament, opposition parties and non-governmental organisations. His KGB buddies helped him with the task.

The most politically active oligarchs, Mr Berezovsky, who had helped Mr Putin come to power, and Mr Gusinsky, were pushed out of the country, and their television channels were taken back into state hands. Mr Khodorkovsky, Russia's richest man, was more stubborn. Despite several warnings, he continued to support opposition parties and NGOs and refused to leave Russia. In 2003 the FSB arrested him and, after a show trial, helped put him in jail.

To deal with unruly regional governors, Mr Putin appointed special envoys with powers of supervision and control. Most of them were KGB veterans. The governors lost their budgets and their seats in the upper house of the Russian parliament. Later the voters lost their right to elect them.

All the strategic decisions, according to Ms Kryshtanovskaya, were and still are made by the small group of people who have formed Mr Putin's informal politburo. They include two deputy heads of the presidential administration: Igor Sechin, who officially controls the flow of documents but also oversees economic matters, and Viktor Ivanov, responsible for personnel in the Kremlin and beyond. Then come Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the FSB, and Sergei Ivanov, a former defence minister and now the first deputy prime minister. All are from St Petersburg, and all served in intelligence or counter-intelligence. Mr Sechin is the only one who does not advertise his background.

That two of the most influential men, Mr Sechin and Viktor Ivanov, hold only fairly modest posts (each is a deputy head) and seldom appear in public is misleading. It was, after all, common Soviet practice to have a deputy, often linked to the KGB, who carried more weight than his notional boss. "These people feel more comfortable when they are in the shadows," explains Ms Kryshtanovskaya.

In any event, each of these KGB veterans has a plethora of followers in other state institutions. One of Mr Patrushev's former deputies, also from the KGB, is the minister of the interior, in charge of the police. Sergei Ivanov still commands authority

within the army's headquarters. Mr Sechin has close family ties to the minister of justice. The prosecution service, which in Soviet times at least nominally controlled the KGB's work, has now become its instrument, along with the tax police.

The political clout of these *siloviki* is backed by (or has resulted in) state companies with enormous financial resources. Mr Sechin, for example, is the chairman of Rosneft, Russia's largest state-run oil company. Viktor Ivanov heads the board of directors of Almaz-Antei, the country's main producer of air-defence rockets, and of Aeroflot, the national airline. Sergei Ivanov oversees the military-industrial complex and is in charge of the newly created aircraft-industry monopoly.

But the *siloviki* reach farther, into all areas of Russian life. They can be found not just in the law-enforcement agencies but in the ministries of economy, transport, natural resources, telecoms and culture. Several KGB veterans occupy senior management posts in Gazprom, Russia's biggest company, and its pocket bank, Gazprombank (whose vice-president is the 26-year-old son of Sergei Ivanov).

Alexei Gromov, Mr Putin's trusted press secretary, sits on the board of Channel One, Russia's main television channel. The railway monopoly is headed by Vladimir Yakunin, a former diplomat who served his country at the United Nations in New York and is believed to have held a high rank in the KGB. Sergei Chemezov, Mr Putin's old KGB friend from his days in Dresden (where the president worked from 1985 to 1990), is in charge of Rosoboronexport, a state arms agency that has grown on his watch into a vast conglomerate. The list goes on.

Many officers of the active reserve have been seconded to Russia's big companies, both private and state-controlled, where they draw a salary while also remaining on the FSB payroll. "We must make sure that companies don't make decisions that are not in the interest of the state," one current FSB colonel explains. Being an active-reserve officer in a firm is, says another KGB veteran, a dream job: "You get a huge salary and you get to keep your FSB card." One such active-reserve officer is the 26-year-old son of Mr Patrushev who was last year seconded from the FSB to Rosneft, where he is now advising Mr Sechin. (After seven months at Rosneft, Mr Putin awarded Andrei Patrushev the Order of Honour, citing his professional successes and "many years of conscientious work".) Rosneft was the main recipient of Yukos's assets after the firm was destroyed.

The attack on Yukos, which entered its decisive stage just as Mr Sechin was appointed to Rosneft, was the first and most blatant example of property redistribution towards the *siloviki,* but not the only one. Mikhail Gutseriev, the owner of Russneft, a fast-growing oil company, was this month forced to give up his business after being accused of illegal activities. For a time, he had refused; but, as he explained, "they tightened the screws" and one state agency after another—the general prosecutor's office, the tax police, the interior ministry—began conducting checks on him.

From Oligarchy to Spookocracy

The transfer of financial wealth from the oligarchs to the *siloviki* was perhaps inevitable. It certainly met with no objection from most Russians, who have little sympathy for "robber barons". It even earned the *siloviki* a certain popularity. But whether they will make a success of managing their newly acquired assets is doubtful. "They know how to break up a company or to confiscate something. But they don't know how to manage a business. They use force simply because they don't know any other method," says an ex-KGB spook who now works in business.

Curiously, the concentration of such power and economic resources in the hands of a small group of *siloviki,* who identify themselves with the state, has not alienated people in the lower ranks of the security services. There is trickle-down of a sort: the salary of an average FSB operative has gone up several times over the past decade, and a bit of freelancing is tolerated. Besides, many Russians inside and outside the ranks believe that the transfer of assets from private hands to the *siloviki* is in the interests of the state. "They are getting their own back and they have the right to do so," says Mr Goloshchapov.

The rights of the *siloviki,* however, have nothing to do with the formal kind that are spelled out in laws or in the constitution. What they are claiming is a special mission to restore the power of the state, save Russia from disintegration and frustrate the enemies that might weaken it. Such idealistic sentiments, says Mr Kondaurov, coexist with an opportunistic and cynical eagerness to seize the situation for personal or institutional gain.

The security servicemen present themselves as a tight brotherhood entitled to break any laws for the sake of their mission. Their high language is laced with profanity, and their nationalism is often combined with contempt for ordinary people. They are, however, loyal to each other.

Competition to enter the service is intense. The KGB picked its recruits carefully. Drawn from various institutes and universities, they then went to special KGB schools. Today the FSB Academy in Moscow attracts the children of senior *siloviki;* a vast new building will double its size. The point, says Mr Galeotti, the British analyst, "is not just what you learn, but who you meet there".

Graduates of the FSB Academy may well agree. "A Chekist is a breed," says a former FSB general. A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's *siloviki.* Marriages between *siloviki* clans are also encouraged.

Viktor Cherkesov, the head of Russia's drug-control agency, who was still hunting dissidents in the late 1980s, has summed up the FSB psychology in an article that has become the manifesto of the *siloviki* and a call for consolidation.

We [*siloviki*] must understand that we are one whole. History ruled that the weight of supporting the Russian state should fall on our shoulders. I believe in our ability, when we feel danger, to put aside everything petty and to remain faithful to our oath.

As well as invoking secular patriotism, Russia's security bosses can readily find allies among the priesthood. Next to the FSB building in Lubyanka Square stands the 17th-century church of the Holy Wisdom, "restored in August 2001 with zealous help from the FSB," says a plaque. Inside, freshly painted icons gleam with gold. "Thank God there is the FSB. All power is from God and so is theirs," says Father Alexander, who leads the service. A former KGB general agrees: "They really believe

that they were chosen and are guided by God and that even the high oil prices they have benefited from are God's will."

Sergei Grigoryants, who has often been interrogated and twice imprisoned (for anti-Soviet propaganda) by the KGB, says the security chiefs believe "that they are the only ones who have the real picture and understanding of the world." At the centre of this picture is an exaggerated sense of the enemy, which justifies their very existence: without enemies, what are they for? "They believe they can see enemies where ordinary people can't," says Ms Kryshtanovskaya.

"A few years ago, we succumbed to the illusion that we don't have enemies and we have paid dearly for that," Mr Putin told the FSB in 1999. It is a view shared by most KGB veterans and their successors. The greatest danger comes from the West, whose aim is supposedly to weaken Russia and create disorder. "They want to make Russia dependent on their technologies," says a current FSB staffer. "They have flooded our market with their goods. Thank God we still have nuclear arms." The siege mentality of the *siloviki* and their anti-Westernism have played well with the Russian public. Mr Goloshchapov, the private agents' spokesman, expresses the mood this way: "In Gorbachev's time Russia was liked by the West and what did we get for it? We have surrendered everything: eastern Europe, Ukraine, Georgia. NATO has moved to our borders."

From this perspective, anyone who plays into the West's hands at home is the internal enemy. In this category are the last free-thinking journalists, the last NGOs sponsored by the West and the few liberal politicians who still share Western values.

To sense the depth of these feelings, consider the response of one FSB officer to the killing of Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist whose books criticising Mr Putin and his brutal war in Chechnya are better known outside than inside Russia. "I don't know who killed her, but her articles were beneficial to the Western press. She deserved what she got." And so, by this token, did Litvinenko, the ex-KGB officer poisoned by polonium in London last year.

In such a climate, the idea that Russia's security services are entitled to deal ruthlessly with enemies of the state, wherever they may be, has gained wide acceptance and is supported by a new set of laws. One, aimed at "extremism", gives the FSB and other agencies ample scope to pursue anyone who acts or speaks against the Kremlin. It has already been invoked against independent analysts and journalists. A lawyer who complained to the Constitutional Court about the FSB's illegal tapping of his client's telephone has been accused of disclosing state secrets. Several scientists who collaborated with foreign firms are in jail for treason.

Despite their loyalty to old Soviet roots, today's security bosses differ from their predecessors. They do not want a return to communist ideology or an end to capitalism, whose fruits they enjoy. They have none of the asceticism of their forebears. Nor do they relish mass repression: in a country where fear runs deep, attacking selected individuals does the job. But the concentration of such power and money in the hands of the security services does not bode well for Russia.

And Not Very Good at Their Job

The creation of enemies may smooth over clan disagreements and fuel nationalism, but it does not make the country more secure or prosperous. While the FSB reports on the ever-rising numbers of foreign spies, accuses scientists of treason and hails its "brotherhood", Russia remains one of the most criminalised, corrupt and bureaucratic countries in the world.

During the crisis at a school in Beslan in 2004, the FSB was good at harassing journalists trying to find out the truth. But it could not even cordon off the school in which the hostages were held. Under the governorship of an ex-FSB colleague of Mr Putin, Ingushetia, the republic that borders Chechnya, has descended into a new theatre of war. The army is plagued by crime and bullying. Private businessmen are regularly hassled by law-enforcement agencies. Russia's foreign policy has turned out to be self-fulfilling: by perpetually denouncing enemies on every front, it has helped to turn many countries from potential friends into nervous adversaries.

The rise to power of the KGB veterans should not have been surprising. In many ways, argues Inna Solovyova, a Russian cultural historian, it had to do with the qualities that Russians find appealing in their rulers: firmness, reserve, authority and a degree of mystery. "The KGB fitted this description, or at least knew how to seem to fit it."

But are they doing the country any good? "People who come from the KGB are tacticians. We have never been taught to solve strategic tasks," says Mr Kondaurov. The biggest problem of all, he and a few others say, is the agency's loss of professionalism. He blushes when he talks about the polonium capers in London. "We never sank to this level," he sighs. "What a blow to the country's reputation!"

Critical Thinking

1. What is the Federal Security Service? What are its powers? Its limitations?
2. What evidence suggests that the Federal Security Service has exceeded its bounds?
3. What is the basis for the Federal Security Service's invocation of authority?
4. Discuss how the Federal Security Service is "not very good" at its job.

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Name ____________________

AP Comparative Government
Putin's Reforms in Russia – Debate

Side A
President Putin's reforms are a good for Russia.

Side B
President Putin's reforms were bad for Russia.

Preparation Assignment (Homework)

1. Read "Russian Democracy Under Putin" by Michael McFaul
2. Summarize this article section by section.
3. **Find at least one current event to update this article. Your current event <u>must</u> provide new information and be about changes made by Vladimir Putin.**
4. List three arguments that will support side (A) and three arguments that will support side (B) in a chart similar to the one below.

Preparation Assignment (In-Class) Debate will take place on __________________

You will draw from a hat to determine which side of the debate you will be on. Then, each side will be given approximately time to prepare. Each side is to make a list on news print of their arguments, beginning with the best argument down to their weakest argument. Then identify the arguments you believe your opposition will say and discuss how you will refute their arguments.

Debate Procedure: Side A and B will be seated facing one another. Side A will begin, raise your hand when you have a comment. I will call on students from sides a/b. This debate will last approximately 15 minutes. At the conclusion of the debate we will debrief – I will ask you if you agreed with your side and why.

Arguments in Favor of Side A	Arguments in Favor of Side B

independence.

Nonetheless, the Russian state and Russian society displayed features of democratic development.3 Elections took place under a set of rules recognized by all. The results of these elections were not entirely certain beforehand, and no authority intervened after Election Day to reverse the outcome of the voting. The playing field for competitors in elections was never equal and has steadily become less so. Nonetheless, the rulers of Russia were selected in competitive elections. The regime that emerged in the 1990s was qualitatively different from the communist and tsarist dictatorships.

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Since Vladimir Putin became president at the beginning of 2000, democratic institutions have eroded. When Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister in the fall of 1999, the regime's uncertain and unconsolidated nature lowered the barriers for institutional change. Putin soon put his imprint not only on policy but on institutions. He has not amended or radically violated the 1993 constitution, and he has not upended the institutional configuration of Yeltsin's regime. Nor does he seem to have any coherent plan for doing so. He has, however, initiated or tolerated a series of discrete changes that have diminished the democratic legacy of the reform years. Yeltsin, in recruiting Putin from the closed world of the security agencies and announcing him as the "steel core" of a revitalized government, undoubtedly expected a course correction toward discipline and order. He now thinks that Putin has gone too far in certain respects. However, Yeltsin's feelings are irrelevant. What is important and worrisome is the cumulative impact of the changes.

Putin's innovations coincide with a spate of revisionist thinking about democratization in the contemporary world. Some say that autocracies are being replaced, as often as not, by hybrid regimes entwining democratic with authoritarian principles. Others go further, asserting that Russia and a series of other countries are best thought of as "competitive-authoritarian" systems, in which the authoritarian element has the upper hand.4 Much ink has been spilled in recent years on the failure of the promising "third wave" of global democratization, which extended from the 1970s into the 1990s, and was capped by the fall of the Soviet dictatorship and its satellites in Eastern Europe. Although there have been democratic success stories in the former Soviet Union, there have been terrible failures and disappointments as well.5

It is premature to pigeonhole Russia into any of these autocratic categories. The phrase "managed democracy" will do as a marker for the current condition of its polity. If it is too early to sign the death certificate for democracy, it is too late to ignore tokens of a backing away from the liberal and democratic ideals in which name the Soviet regime was overthrown. Having begun on Yeltsin's watch, the retreat has gathered momentum under Putin. Russia's present rulers are modernizers in the economic and socioeconomic sphere and pro-Western realists in foreign policy.

In the political domain, they take the electoral mechanism and the trappings of democracy for granted. They accept that they must periodically renew their popular mandate and that when they do, society must be afforded alternatives to the status quo. They are also reconciled to a limited diversity of opinions and interests within the state machinery. Without setting out to extinguish it, they aim to contain this

diversity within boundaries they alone fix. For those at the rudder, democracy is neither good nor evil. It is an existential product of larger forces that, like gravity, cannot be stopped, yet, with the appropriate engineering, can be harnessed to one's own purpose. Institutional change under Putin has reflected this odd blend of preserving formal democratic practices and at the same time weakening the actual democratic content of these political rules and norms.

The New Balance of Power in the Duma

Putin took office bent on resuming the economic reforms that had been stymied by governmental disorganization and legislative resistance in Yeltsin's second term. Although he selected a face from the Yeltsin era, Mikhail Kasianov, to head his first cabinet, Putin inserted a team of market liberals into the next tier, most of them known to him from his St. Petersburg days. Key players were the new first deputy prime minister and minister of finance, Aleksei Kudrin (a fellow vice mayor with Putin under Anatolii Sobchak), the minister for economic development and trade, German Gref, and the president's personal adviser on economic affairs, the iconoclastic Andrei Illarionov. The team came in with an ambitious program encompassing tax reform, land privatization, deregulation, changes in labor and welfare policy, and incentives for foreign investors.

The 1999-2000 electoral cycle put in place a Duma and a president with the same basic political orientation, enabling rapid progress on this reform agenda. The Unity bloc, partnering with the People's Deputy faction (consisting of pro-Kremlin deputies from the districts) and Regions of Russia (which parted from Fatherland-All Russia [OVR] after the Duma election), materialized as the pivotal force in the Duma.6 These political partners made a deal with the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) to divide the chairs of major committees, cutting out OVR, the Union of Right Forces (SPS), Yabloko, and the Liberal Democrats (LDPR).7 The pact gave the KPRF's Gennadii Seleznev a second term as speaker. Seleznev's subsequent departure from the communist hierarchy made it apparent that he now had a binding commitment to Putin and the Kremlin. Unity's alliance with the KPRF was purely tactical and unwound in the course of 2000 and 2001. Unity increasingly counted on rightist deputies to help it pursue its legislative agenda, leaving the jilted KPRF leader, Gennadii Ziuganov, to huff at Putin as a "liberal dictator."8

For the first time since 1993, the balance of power in the Russian parliament is decisively anti-communist. The Duma has not indulged in squabbling with the president by debating impeachment and censure resolutions. Pushed to act on the economy by Putin and his government, the Duma has enacted new sections of the Russian tax code, which had been in legislative limbo for years, putting in place a flat income tax of 13 percent and a lower profits tax.9 It has gone along with a new labor code, considered very friendly to business interests, and a land code that allows for the ownership and sale of farms and urban land. Putin and the executive branch have also managed to work with the Duma to pass balanced and feasible budgets, a feat rarely accomplished in the Yeltsin years, when parliament and president were so bitterly estranged.10 Putin has not yet sent the Duma draft legislation on some of the most painful structural changes, such as those touching on pensions and social assistance. Nevertheless, much has been accomplished since the polarization of executive and legislature was eased as a consequence of the 1999-2000 elections.11

The new relationship between the Duma and the president is not "anti-democratic." Every president around the world wants to work with a pliant parliament. Executives in liberal democracies most certainly spend considerable political and material resources to achieve a pro-presidential majority in their legislatures. The anti-democratic flavor of current executive-legislative relations in Russia comes from the way in which the new pro-presidential majority was achieved, that is, through an election in which the playing field was not level for all participants. Unlike any previous parliamentary election in Russia, the Kremlin intervened actively in the 1999 contest to assist Unity and destroy Fatherland-All Russia. The Kremlin relied on its allies in the country's two largest television networks, ORT and RTR, to unleash a negative assault against Fatherland-All Russia. Although other factors contributed to Unity's strong finish and Fatherland-All Russia's disappointing showing in the 1999 parliamentary vote, the playing field for the two parties was not equal.12

Weakening the Federation Council

Putin has assembled super-majorities in the Duma-majorities capable of overriding vetoes of bills handed down by the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament. As a result, he has been able to transform the organization of the upper house and therefore the federal system. To everyone's surprise, Putin made reform of the Federation Council one of his top political goals in his first months in office.

The Russian constitution states that after an interim period during which members would be directly elected (1993-1995), each region of the federation was to send two deputies to the Federation Council: one representing the province's legislative assembly, and one representing its chief executive. The constitution did not specify how these representatives were to be selected. By the end of the two years, the regional governments had won agreement on a law mandating that all provincial leaders were to be popularly elected-until then, Yeltsin had appointed many governors-and that governors and legislative heads would henceforth sit ex officio in the Federation Council. This formulation gave the governors and their legislative colleagues increased local legitimacy and greater autonomy from Yeltsin and Moscow. By granting the governors and republic presidents a direct voice in the national parliament, it also created a constitutional anomaly in that these figures would be concurrently executives and legislators. The Federation Council functioned mostly as a lobby for regional interests.

Two weeks after he was sworn into office, Putin proposed a new recipe for the upper house that replaced the regional leaders with persons designated by them under an intricate formula.13 The members of the Federation Council resisted tenaciously, knowing they would lose their apartments and offices in Moscow, their parliamentary immunity, and much of their clout with the federal government. After a heated battle, in which the Duma said it would override a Federation Council veto and the Kremlin allegedly threatened governors with criminal investigations if they did not support Putin's plan, the law was adopted in July 2000. As a sop, many governors and retired governors were appointed to a new presidential advisory body, the State Council.

The reform has emaciated a significant institutional counterweight to the president. Council members, being unelected, do not have the same authority as their predecessors. Many, in fact, are Muscovites with patronage ties to Putin-they

obtained their seats with his administration's backing and have put the Kremlin's interests ahead of their constituents.14 The new setup also makes it more difficult for regional leaders to take collective action vis-à-vis the central government. As the Duma deputy Vladimir Lysenko stated in 2001, "The president had managed to get rid of one of the strongest and most authoritative state bodies in the country. Under the old structure, the Federation Council provided somewhat of a check and balance on the other branches of power, especially the executive, which is fast evolving into an authoritarian regime."15 Putin's reforms of the Federation Council did not formally transgress the democratic rules of the game outlined in Russia's constitution. Moreover, the prior method of constituting the upper house was far from perfect, since it blurred the lines between executive and legislative authority. Putin's correction to this odd formation, however, was not the democratizing measure that many had proposed for years-that is, direct election of senators. Instead, his reform decreased the role of the citizenry in selecting its governmental representatives and thus weakened another check on the Kremlin's power.

Moscow Versus the Regions

Putin's clipping of the governors' wings was extended to their home turf by a decree enacted on May 13, 2000. The decree established seven super-regions ("federal districts"), accountable to Moscow, and super-imposed them on the eighty-nine units of the federation. Each super-region was to be headed by a plenipotentiary appointed by the president and sitting on his Security Council. Five of the seven envoys named in 2000 were from the Federal Security Service (FSB), the army, or the police.16 Their writ extends to every federal agency in the regions other than the military forces, and thus they have access to officials in the politically most sensitive and influential agencies, such as the treasury, the tax inspectorate, the procuracy, the FSB, and the regular police. Their mission is to oversee the activities of the bureaucracy and report to the president's office on any regional noncompliance with the constitution or the law.

Three other changes accompanied the super-regions. First, a law passed in July 2000 authorizes the president to suspend elected governors accused of wrongdoing by the procurator-general's office. Inasmuch as criminal proceedings can drag on indefinitely (especially if it suits the president), the law is tantamount to a presidential right to fire governors. Putin has used the power only once, and indirectly at that (when he orchestrated the ouster of Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko of Primorskii Krai in 2001),17 but the mere threat of it has had a chilling effect on gubernatorial initiative. Putin can also dismiss any regional legislature that passes laws contravening federal laws or the constitution. Second, Putin's government has stopped signing the bilateral agreements with the provinces that were one of Yeltsin's favorite instruments for winning their acquiescence. As of 2003, the division of labor among the national and subnational governments is to be governed by an omnibus law that in principle is to be applied uniformly across Russia. Third, Moscow has pushed through a more centralized allotment of tax receipts. As of 1999, roughly 45 percent of the revenues collected in the regions were supposed to be transferred to the central government, but the amount that reached it was often smaller. Under a law signed by Putin in 2000, about 55 percent is to go to Moscow and 45 percent to the regions, and the balance is to be reviewed regularly. Regions like Bashkortostan, which for years paid almost no federal taxes by a virtue of bilateral agreement, are once again contributing to the federal budget.

Party Fractures, Election Machinations

Russia's party system does not perform the role that party systems play in working democracies. Most of the country's parties lack a distinct identity or a stable following. They have little effect on the elections that count, the ones in which the president and the regional administrative heads are chosen. Russian electoral law assigns political parties a pivotal role in parliamentary elections, but nonpartisans and weak party organizations continue to play a critical role. Finally, there is little internal cohesion within the parties that remain.

Fatherland-All Russia. The Fatherland-All Russia bloc (OVR), the founding of which initiated the electoral struggle, spoke for current and recent officeholders who sought control of the national government on the assumption that Yeltsin and his entourage were a spent force. Unity, the response to OVR's challenge, was initially created by some pro-Kremlin governors and businessmen like Boris Berezovskii who were concerned about the problems they would face if OVR and former prime minister Evgenii Primakov came to power.

Both founding groups miscalculated. OVR made the biggest blunder when it fumbled the Duma election and then concluded that it could not field a credible candidate for president. All Russia and the Regions of Russia caucus defected in January 2000 and mended fences with the Kremlin. In due course, the entire coalition followed abjectly into Putin's camp.

Unity. The original masterminds of Unity miscalculated in a different way. Unity achieved electoral success and incorporation into the power structure, but its architect, Berezovskii, did not survive as a political insider. Anticipating Putin's gratitude, Berezovskii got the back of his hand, because Putin feared that the "Family" group around Berezovskii and his business ventures had too much influence. He first ostracized Berezovskii and then pushed him into exile in London in 2001. Unity thrived without Berezovskii, upgrading its legal status from electoral bloc to civic movement and then, in 2002, into a political party named Unified Russia. OVR agreed to a phased-in merger with Unified Russia that will be complete in time for the 2003 parliamentary election. Whereas Yeltsin discarded two consecutive parties of power, Russia's Choice and Our Home Is Russia, Putin favors strengthening Unity/Unified Russia as an organization and seems ready to endorse and assist it in the 2003 parliamentary elections.

Communists. A smoldering disagreement in the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the main opposition party, between the leader, Ziuganov, and the parliamentary speaker, Seleznev, burst into flame in 2002. Seleznev resigned from the party but, with Kremlin support, kept the speaker's job. He has formed his own political organization, Russia (Rossiia), and vows to battle the KPRF for leftist votes in the next elections. Many members are disgruntled with Ziuganov's inflexibility, and thus the KPRF may very well nominate a younger, less hidebound individual, such as Sergei Glazev, as its presidential standard bearer in 2004. Despite these internal battles, the KPRF is poised to benefit from its loyal and stable electorate. Compared to all of Russia's other parties, the KPRF has the most promising short-term future.

Union of Right Forces. On the right, the SPS has made the transition from a coalition

of parties and movements to a political party. The head of its 1999 slate, Sergei Kirienko, withdrew from partisan activity when he became Putin's plenipotentiary in the Volga super-region. This left Boris Nemtsov as parliamentary chair, with Anatolii Chubais, Yeltsin's privatization tsar, lurking in the wings. Having cooperated with the government and seen it institute a liberal economic policy, SPS worries that it will not have a attractive platform to sell to the electorate in 2003. Several veterans of the Russian democratic movement, most prominently human rights advocate Sergei Kovalev, have quit the party in disgust at its pro-war stance on Chechnya.18 With Unity creeping to the right and the Kremlin ever more hostile to its leaders, SPS will have to fight hard to maintain its slightly right-of-center electoral base in the 2003 parliamentary elections.

Yabloko. SPS's liberal rival, Yabloko, suffered a number of defections after March 2000, including the manager of its 1999 campaign, Viacheslav Igrunov, who left to form his own boutique political movement.19 Grigorii Yavlinskii remains at the helm and has firmed his relationship with Mikhail Khodorkovskii, the CEO of Yukos and the richest man in Russia. Sporadic negotiations with SPS about a common slate in 2003 or other forms of collaboration have been in vain.20 After years of standoffishness toward the government, Yavlinskii has edged closer to Putin, perhaps aware of how much the president's blessings could help him in the next election. Putin's attitude toward the liberals was apparently influenced by their conduct during the crisis sparked by the seizure of hundreds of hostages in a Moscow theater by Chechen fighters in October 2002. He accused Nemtsov of exploiting the disaster for political gain and praised Yavlinskii for not doing so. His reaction fueled suspicion that Putin may back Yabloko as his liberal ally instead of SPS.21

Long-Term Effects. Whatever comes of these partisan intrigues and squabbles, there are two other changes underway that must be watched for their long-term effects. The first stems from the interest of the Russian leadership in revamping the rules for party formation and State Duma elections. Addressing Unity's convention in February 2000, Putin spoke in favor of a "workable" party system made up of "two, three, or four parties."22 Streamlining was the main aim of a new law on parties passed in 2001, which stiffened the requirements for registration and stipulated that electoral blocs would now have to include one political party. In 1999, Unity called for an end to proportional representation and for all deputies to be elected in districts. Its motivations were not altruistic. Unity's poor showing in the districts in 1999 notwithstanding, its founders calculated that a party of power would do better in a district-based system, especially if it could polarize the district races and then prevail in the runoff. Unity and its Duma allies have so far failed to institute such a change, but in 2002, they raised the threshold for the party list from 5 to 7 percent, effective in 2007 (they originally proposed 12.5 percent), which will decrease the number of parties that get into parliament. Putin's brain trust hopes eventually to push all parties other than Unified Russia and the KPRF to the sidelines.23 If the communists and Unified Russia were to cooperate in getting rid of proportional representation altogether, Russia's proto-multiparty system might easily become a hegemonic party system dominated by Unified Russia.24

The second and more alarming trend is toward arbitrary interference by the central authorities in regional elections, usually with the connivance of local politicos, electoral commissions, and courts. The tone was set in November 2000, when Kremlin officials pressured a judge to remove the incumbent, Aleksandr Rutskoi,

from the gubernatorial ballot in Kursk on the eve of the election. Rutskoi, a supporter of Unity in 1999 and Russia's vice president from 1991 to 1993, had, among other things, offended Putin during the controversy about the sinking of the submarine Kursk several months before.25 In April 2002, the scenario was repeated with the front-runner for president of Ingushetiia, a republic bordering Chechnya.26 The same year, Moscow intervened on behalf of clients in gubernatorial elections in Krasnoiarsk and Nizhnii Novgorod, and there were charges of fraud in the vote counting.27 Such practices, whether or not they spread to the national level, compromise Russia's functioning even as an electoral democracy. As Andreas Shedler has observed, the process of assessing electoral democracies is like multiplying by zero, as opposed to adding: "Partial compliance to democratic norms does not add up to partial democracy. Gross violation of any one condition invalidates the fulfillment of all the others. If the chain of democratic choice is broken anywhere, elections become not less democratic but undemocratic."28

The lack of strong opposition parties and the central state's ability to intervene in local elections underscore the weakness of the checks on the Kremlin's power. Rather than consolidating, these potential balancers of presidential power have weakened with time.

Chechnya and Civil Liberties

Putin's rise to power dovetailed with a cruel war in Chechnya, the second Russia had fought there since 1994. In the 1999-2000 electoral cycle, voters saw Unity and then Putin as the political players who could best handle this tormenting issue. The initial use of force against the Chechen fighters making raids on nearby Dagestan in 1999 was justified. Russia also had a sovereign right to deal with the lawlessness that enveloped Chechnya after the Khasavyurt accord ended the first war in 1996, a plague whose barbarous manifestations included was a wave of kidnappings and the execution of hostages. The Russian government's response-full-scale reoccupation, bombardment by heavy weaponry, oppressive patrols and "filtration camps" for segregating and interrogating suspects-has not brought about the promised result. Putin has pledged military reform, as did Yeltsin before him, and appointed a civilian, Sergei Ivanov of the FSB, as defense minister in 2000, but this objective has taken a back seat to prosecuting the war with archaic military forces consisting of sullen conscripts led by a Soviet-era officer corps.29

Wars are always brutal, and Chechnya is no exception, but the violence of the guerrillas and the terrorists linked to them does not exonerate Russia's routinely inhumane actions. Human Rights Watch has documented atrocities that include summary shootings, the torching of villages, the rape of Chechen women, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war.30 Experts reckon that the fighting has displaced 400,000 refugees.31 Moscow has no strategy for either withdrawal or a negotiated settlement. The March 2003 referendum on Chechnya's status, in which more than 90 percent of its citizens supposedly endorsed all three of Moscow's questions, was a farce, emphasizing yet again the lack of a serious plan to end the bloodshed. To stanch the flow of information about human rights violations, Russia has expelled the observer mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe from the republic.

President Putin has loosened the leash on the FSB, which he headed in 1998-1999

and which is now directed by his associate Nikolai Patrushev. The agency has stepped up its harassment of targeted human rights activists and environmentalists, Western non-governmental organizations, and religious groups affiliated with outside organizations.32 New guidelines on foreign contacts for academics have been issued, and contacts with scientists in so-called closed nuclear cities are restricted. Several academics and environmentalists have been prosecuted for espionage, although the most conspicuous cases ended with acquittals or pardons.33 At the end of 2002, the FSB became more aggressive about limiting contacts between Russian citizens and foreigners. The Ministry of the Interior must now review most visa invitations to non-Russians. In addition to evicting the OSCE from Chechnya, the Russian government canceled its agreement with the U.S. Peace Corps and refused reentry to Irene Stevenson, the long-time director of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center in Moscow.

Muzzling the Independent Media

Putin has also tightened the state's grip on the mass media, assigning priority to national television.34 The commercial network NTV supported OVR in the Duma campaign and, though less warmly, Yavlinskii in the presidential campaign, and provided the most candid coverage of the two Chechen wars. Putin moved to settle scores in the spring of 2000. His Kremlin administration leaned on prosecutors to investigate alleged past misdeeds of Vladimir Gusinskii, president of the Media-Most company, which owned NTV. Gazprom, the natural gas conglomerate with strong ties to the Kremlin, then called in a large loan to NTV. In the space of several months, Gazprom's media holding company took control of the network, Gusinskii fled abroad, the staff of the weekly newsmagazine Itogi was fired, and most Media-Most ancillaries were shut down. Gazprom purged NTV a second time in January 2003, removing Boris Jordan, the Russian-American director it had appointed in 2000, due to NTV's critical coverage of the government's handling of the hostage crisis in a theater in downtown Moscow in the fall of 2002. Evgenii Kiselev and many of NTV's best journalists and producers migrated to TV-6, a much smaller station owned by Berezovskii, only to have the government close it. The former NTV employees got back on the air on a channel called TVS in 2002, but it has only a small fraction of the national audience. One of the original TVS board members, Evgenii Primakov, "called on editorial staff to exercise 'internal censorship' in order to keep the network 'responsible.' "35 By the time Berezovskii relinquished TV-6, he had already ceded his large minority stake and editorial control in ORT, and Sergei Dorenko, the sarcastic newscaster who was his and the Kremlin's battering ram against OVR in 1999, had been sent packing. Governmental agencies have severely restricted access to Chechnya by Russian and foreign correspondents, and have arrested and intimidated several print journalists whose war stories they found inconvenient.36

The struggle about the media involves business and personality issues as well as questions of free speech. The losers to date are not blameless. Gusinskii's financial practices were questionable, and NTV did not offer equal access to all comers during the 1999-2000 elections. Nevertheless, the pluralism that comes from multiple owners and multiple biases is preferable to the monotone that would result from a total state monopoly of the news. In nationwide television broadcasting, Russia is closer to such a monopoly today than at any time since the establishment of NTV in 1993. In its Global Survey of Media Independence for 2003, Freedom House listed

Russia as "not free" for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the 2003-2004 round of elections approaches, even moderate opponents of Putin have many fewer outlets for delivering their message than in 1999-2000.37

Putin's Agenda and the Future of Russian Democracy

Putin and his statecraft cannot be appraised on one level or by one criterion. Enough is not yet known to make it possible to sort through the ellipses and contradictions in the thinking of the public man. The private man is hidden behind many veils.

Some of what is here called managed democracy is a pragmatic response to the trying circumstances Russia found itself in at the end of the 1990s. Boris Yeltsin, capable of flashes of imagination and boldness, was bored with the minutiae of government and preferred changing officials to rethinking policies. To buy support and stability in tumultuous times, he repeatedly made concessions to groups like the provincial governors and the new business elite, barely considering the costs. Putin inherited these arrangements, found many of them lacking, and set out to enforce or negotiate better terms. The particulars often reflect common sense more than ideology, and might very well have been implemented no matter who succeeded Yeltsin. Although the means have sometimes been suspect, there is nothing objectionable in Putin's ending the polarization of executive and legislature, removing the anomaly of governors sitting in the upper house of parliament, squeezing more tax revenues from the provinces, tinkering with the electoral system, putting one or two of the most arrogant oligarchs in their place, and retaliating against the Chechen incursion into Dagestan. In economic policy, Putin has listened to liberal advice and converted it into legislation more consistently and effectively than Yeltsin did. His reforms, along with the 1998 devaluation and the rise in world oil prices, have helped sustain an economic recovery now in its fifth year, a welcome respite after so long in the doldrums.

Prolonged economic growth should be conducive to democracy, for it will grow a middle class that will demand freedoms and accountable governance.38 This could end up being Putin's most benign legacy to Russia. Nor should one ignore the institutional and political projects he supports that may ultimately strengthen democratic governance. To his credit, for example, Putin favors legal reforms that will pare the power of prosecutors, introduce jury trials nationwide, and lessen the incarceration rate. In 2002, he vetoed restrictive amendments to the law on the mass media passed by parliament after the Moscow hostage crisis. On occasion at least, Putin says the right things about democracy and human rights. In November 2001, he attended a Civic Forum sponsored by his administration with the purpose of bridging the chasm between state officials and grassroots activists. The sight of a former KGB agent, Putin, sitting at the same table as a former Soviet dissident and Helsinki Watch leader, Ludmila Alekseeva, was a stirring one, although some fretted that it was all a ploy to co-opt activists.39 A year later, Putin met with a similar group on International Human Rights Day and proclaimed that his heart was with them: Protecting civil rights and freedoms is a highly relevant issue for Russia. You know that next year will see the tenth anniversary of our constitution. It declares the basic human rights and freedoms to be the highest value and it enshrines them as self-implementing standards. I must say that this is of course a great achievement.40

Unfortunately, Putin's actions are all too frequently at variance with his words. He

has worked assiduously to weaken the ramshackle checks and balances built up during Yeltsin's tenure and to impose the tidy logic of the rationalizer and controller but not, as a rule, the logic of the democrat. Yeltsin loved adding pawns to the political chessboard. Putin is happier subtracting them, as he has with Fatherland-All Russia, the oligarchs who got too close to the throne (Berezovskii and Gusinskii), the governors who rashly meddled in Moscow politics, the parties he wants to limit to "two, three, or four," and the elected government of Chechnya. When the chips are down, Putin has shown himself to be, if not actively antagonistic to democratic values, indifferent to their application. In his pursuit of a strong state that can solve Russia's problems, he tends to forget what he said in his open letter to the electorate in February 2000-that a strong state, capable of promoting popular freedom and welfare, must itself be "bound by the laws." A presidential administration that schemes to have candidates whisked off the ballot hours before a gubernatorial election is not one bound by the law. Neither is a government that invokes phony legal excuses to seize control of an NTV or a TV-6 or that lets ill-trained troops run amok in the North Caucasus.

It is not the trees that one should dwell on here but the forest. Democracy as practiced by Putin is partly about practical problem-solving, but it is also about eliminating external checks on the power of the state and the leader without scrapping the constitutional framework bequeathed by Yeltsin. Russia's political institutions were never more than partly democratic and were not properly consolidated during the Yeltsin period. This makes it all the more deplorable that Putin has diverted the country further away from democratic development. After the critical set of elections in 1999-2000 and the first several years in office of the talented leader who triumphed in them, the future of Russian democracy is, in fact, more uncertain than before. Theorists and policymakers must come to grips with the regime trajectory in Russia today. The country is not following the democratic-transition script. Contrary to what some in the Bush administration believe, Russia is very unlikely to graduate to liberal democratic status by 2008.

The impact on the regime of Putin's rise to power suggests that the current political system has not consolidated. Russia's nascent democracy is on a negative trajectory, but the unconsolidated state of the regime gives some cause for hope. The regime has not become a total dictatorship.41 Whether Putin even wants to create such a regime is an open question. Whether he could is also uncertain. Although weak throughout the 1990s and weaker today than just two years ago, democratic rules and procedures are still embedded in the regime, and democratic norms permeate society.42 Above all else, every major political actor in Russia today believes that elections are the only legitimate way to choose national leaders. No serious leader or political force in Russia today has articulated an alternative model to democracy. For the near future, Putin and his advisers seem likely to manage a version of democracy that limits real political competition and blocks the strengthening of alternative sources of political power. During new crises or after unforeseen events, "managed democracy" can become unmanageable, and pseudo-democratic institutions may suddenly gain real democratic content. The experience of Slobodan Milosevi淡 in the former Yugoslavia and Leonid Kuchma in Ukraine demonstrates how formal democratic rules can suddenly and surprisingly undermine the best plans for "managing" democracy.

In Russia, though, the most likely outcome for the near future is neither more democracy nor more autocracy-neither liberal democracy nor dictatorship-but a

stable regime somewhere in between. Putin has eroded democratic institutions and practices but has not destroyed them, nor has he articulated a plan for their further erosion. Russian society seems content with the current quasi-democratic, quasi-autocratic order. Russians value democracy but are too exhausted, from decades of turmoil, to fight for better democracy. Stability is the greater priority. Managed democracy could be around in Russia for a long time.

END

Notes

1. For more skeptical assessments, see Vladimir Brovkin, "The Emperor's New Clothes: Continuities of Soviet Political Culture in Contemporary Russia," Problems of Post-Communism 43, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 21-28; Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski, Market Bolshevism: The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999); Stephen Cohen, "Russian Studies Without Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs 15, no. 1 (1999): 37-55; Lilia Shevstova, Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).

2. On the differences between electoral and liberal democracies, see Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

3. For elaboration of the authors' views on this subject, see Timothy J. Colton, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael McFaul, Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

4. See Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 21-35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy 13, no. 3 (July 2002): 51-65; Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Democracy after Communism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

5. Michael McFaul, "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World," World Politics 54, no. 2 (January 2002): 212-44.

6. See Thomas F. Remington, "Putin, the Duma, and Political Parties," in Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, ed. Dale R. Herspring (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 39-62.

7. The pact scrapped a rule of thumb that assigned committee chairs in proportion to the size of the respective fractions. OVR and the two liberal groups, SPS and Yabloko, boycotted Duma sessions for several weeks, to no end.

8. Quoted by Susan Glasser in the Washington Post (June 8, 2002): A14.

9. For details on the package, see Erika Weinthal and Pauline Jones Luong, "Resource Wealth and Institutional Change: The Political Economy of Tax Reform in